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Equilibrium in the Assignment Market under Budget
Constraints1
Gerard van der Laan2, Dolf Talman3, and Zaifu Yang4
Abstract: We reexamine the well-known assignment market model in a more
general and more practical environment where agents may be financially con-
strained. These constraints will be shown to have an important impact on the
set of Walrasian equilibria. We prove that a price adjustment process will ei-
ther find a unique minimal Walrasian equilibrium price vector, or exclusively
validate the nonexistence of equilibrium.
Keywords: Assignment, Auction, Budget Constraint, Walrasian Equilibrium.
JEL classification: C62, C68, C71, D44.
1 Introduction
We reexamine the assignment market in a more general and more practical setting in which
buyers may face financial constraints. In this market every buyer has a valuation on every
indivisible item and also a limited amount of budget. His budget may be less than his
valuation over some item. We are interested in the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium
in this market, as such an equilibrium generates an efficient allocation of scarce resources.
In particular, we attempt to address the following two basic questions: How budgets will
affect the set of Walrasian equilibria? How to determine whether there is no Walrasian
equilibrium or not. When no bidder faces any budget constraint, this model reduces to
the celebrated assignment market model as studied by Koopmans and Beckmann (1957),
Shubik and Shapley (1972), Crawford and Knoer (1981), Leonard (1983), and Demange,
Gale, and Sotomayor (1986).
Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) introduced the assignment model and proved the
existence of a Walrasian equilibrium. Shubik and Shapley (1972) formulated the problem as
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a cooperative game and showed that the core of the game coincides with the set of Walrasian
equilibrium price vectors and is a closed lattice. The lattice contains a unique minimal
price vector in the best interests of buyers and a unique maximum price vector in the
best interests of sellers. Crawford and Knoer (1981) developed a price adjustment process
which converges to a Walarasian equilibrium in the limit. Leonard (1983) discovered that
the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector of the market is the Vickrey-Clarke-
Grove payment vector. Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) developed an ascending
auction process which finds this minimum price vector and thus can induce every bidder
to bid truthfully. More recently, Andersson and Erlanson (2013) proposed a mixture of
ascending and descending strategy-proof auctions. Andersson and Svensson (2014) studied
non-manipulable allocation rules for an extended assignment model in which prices are
restricted.
In the paper we will demonstrate that financial constraints can have an important
impact on the set of Walrasian equilibria. We then establish that the set is a lower semi-
lattice, which might be empty or not a closed set anymore, in contrast to the nonempty
closed lattice of the classic case without financial constraints. To address the two basic
problems mentioned above, we need to work on the set denoted by NOD of feasible integer
price vectors at which there is no overdemanded set of items. Given a feasible price vector,
a set of items is overdemanded if the number of buyers who demand only items in the
set exceeds the number of items in the set. We prove that the set NOD is a nonempty
semi-lattice and contains a unique minimal integer price vector pmin. We further show
that if the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors is not empty, then the vector pmin
must be the minimal integer vector in this set. Furthermore, we apply the Demange-Gale-
Sotomayor auction to this problem and demonstrate that this auction always terminates
with the price vector pmin at which there is no overdemand. If there is no underdemand at
pmin either, then we find a Walrasian equilibrium. Otherwise, we validate the nonexistence
of Walrasian equilibrium.
In the early literature, Che and Gale (1998) and Maskin (2000) pointed out that fi-
nancial constraints can arise in a variety of situations. They examined how to sell a single
item under budget constraints; see also Zheng (2001) and Krishna (2010). Illing and Klüh
(2003), Klemperer (2004), and Milgrom (2004) discussed how budget constraints may have
affected the sale of spectrum licenses in some situations. Hafalir, Ravi, and Sayedi (2012)
studied a sealed-bid Vickrey auction for a divisible good that achieves a near Pareto effi-
ciency. Benôıt and Krishna (2001) and Pitchik (2009) studied auctions for selling two items
to budget constrained bidders. Talman and Yang (2015) introduced a dynamic auction for
the assignment model under budget constraints that finds a core allocation. Van der Laan
and Yang (2016) proposed another auction for finding a constrained equilibrium which
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may not be in the core. None of these studies have investigated the two basic questions
mentioned above which will be addressed in the current paper.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and Section 3
presents the main results.
2 The Model
Consider the assignment market where a seller or auctioneer wants to sell n indivisible
items to m bidders. Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of real items for sale and let
M = {1, 2, · · · ,m} denote the set of bidders. It is assumed that every bidder consumes at
most one real item. In addition to the set of real items there is a dummy item, denoted by
0. The dummy item can be assigned to any number of bidders simultaneously, while any
real item can be assigned only to at most one bidder. The set N0 denotes the set N ∪ {0}
of all items. The seller has for each item j ∈ N0 a nonnegative reservation price cj below
which the item will not be sold. By convention, the reservation price of the dummy item
is known to be c0 = 0. A price vector p = (p0, p1, . . . , pn) ∈ IRn+1+ gives a price pj ≥ 0 for
each item j ∈ N0. A price vector p ∈ IRn+1+ is feasible if p0 = 0 and pj ≥ cj for every j ∈ N .
Every bidder i ∈ M attaches a monetary value to each item given by the valuation
function V i : N0 → IR. Also by convention, the value of the dummy item for every buyer
i ∈ M is known to be V i(0) = 0. Every bidder i ∈ M has a nonnegative budget mi,
being the maximum amount of money he can spend. Without loss of generality we assume
that all seller’s reservation prices and all bidders’ valuations and budgets are integers, as
they all are naturally measured in units of some currency. Because all V i, mi, and cj
are integers, we can prove that an integer solution will be found by our proposed auction
process in which the size of price adjustment is fixed at 1. This assumption can be relaxed
by allowing these primitives to be real numbers.




V i(j) +mi − pj if pj ≤ mi,
−∞ if pj > mi.
By the assumption that bidders are not allowed to have a deficit in money, no bidder is
willing to pay a price for any item above his budget mi. We say that bidder i ∈ M is
budget or financially constrained if mi < maxj∈N0 V
i(j), i.e., the valuation of bidder i for
some items exceeds what he can afford. Otherwise, bidder i faces no financial constraint.
When no bidder is financially constrained, the model reduces to the classical assignment
market model as studied by Koopmans and Beckmann (1957), Shapley and Shubik (1972),
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Crawford and Knoer (1981), Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986), and Andersson and
Erlanson (2013).
A feasible assignment π : M → N0 assigns to every bidder i ∈ M precisely one item
π(i) ∈ N0 such that no real item j ∈ N is assigned to more than one bidder. A feasible
assignment may assign the dummy item to several bidders. A real item j ∈ N is unassigned
at feasible assignment π if there is no i ∈ M such that π(i) = j. Nπ = {j ∈ N | j 6=
π(i) for all i ∈M} denotes the set of unassigned real items at feasible assignment π.
Given a feasible price vector p, the budget set of bidder i ∈M is defined by
Bi(p) = {j ∈ N0 | pj ≤ mi},
and the demand set of bidder i is defined by
Di(p) = {j ∈ Bi(p) | V i(j)− pj = max
k∈Bi(p)
(V i(k)− pk)},
i.e., Di(p) is the collection of most preferred items at p by bidder i within his budget set.
An item j ∈ N0 is in the demand set Di(p) of bidder i ∈M at feasible price vector p if and
only if at p item j can be afforded and maximizes the surplus V i(k)−pk over all affordable
items k. When the demand set contains multiple items, then at the given prices of the
items the bidder is indifferent between any two items in his demand set.
A pair (p, π) of a feasible price vector p and a feasible assignment π is said to be
implementable if pπ(i) ≤ mi for all i ∈ M , i.e., every bidder i ∈ M can afford to buy the
item π(i) assigned to him. Note that an implementable pair (p, π) yields allocation (π, x)
with xi = m
i − pπ(i) ≥ 0 the money amount of bidder i ∈M .
Definition 2.1 An implementable pair (p∗, π∗) is a Walrasian equilibrium (WE) if
(a) π∗(i) ∈ Di(p∗) for all i ∈M ,
(b) p∗j = cj for every j ∈ Nπ∗ .
If (p∗, π∗) is a Walrasian equilibrium, then p∗ is called a (Walrasian) equilibrium or WE
price vector and π∗ a (Walrasian) equilibrium or WE assignment.
The following example shows that financial constraints can have a significant impact
on the set of Walrasian equilibria.
Example 1. Consider a market with two bidders and two real items. The seller’s reserva-
tion prices are given by (c0, c1, c2) = (0, 0, 0) and the bidders’ values are given in Table 1.
For this example we consider three cases of budget constraints.
4
Table 1: Bidders’ values in Example 1.
Item 0 1 2
Bidder 1 0 8 2
Bidder 2 0 6 3
Case 1. When both bidders are not financially constrained, the set of Walrasian equi-
librium price vectors is a nonempty closed lattice given by the set
{(p1, p2) | p2 + 3 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 + 6, 3 ≤ p1 ≤ 8, 0 ≤ p2 ≤ 3}.
The equilibrium assignment is (π(1), π(2)) = (1, 2) by which bidder 1 gets item 1 and
bidder 2 gets item 2, resulting in a total social value of 11.
Case 2. When the two bidders are financially constrained by m1 = 1 and m2 = 2, the
set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors is still a nonempty lattice given by the set
{(p1, p2) | 1 < p1 ≤ 2, 0 ≤ p2 ≤ 1},
which is open from below for the price of item 1. The equilibrium assignment is (π(1), π(2)) =
(2, 1) by which bidder 1 gets item 2 and bidder 2 gets item 1, resulting in a total social
value of 8, less than value 11 of Case 1.
Case 3. When the two bidders have budget constraints m1 = 1 and m2 = 1, the set of
Walrasian equilibrium price vectors is empty. The market has no equilibrium.
Case 3 in Example 1 may suggest that the emptiness of the set of Walrasian equilibria
is caused by the fact that the bidders’ budgets are equal to each other. The next example
shows that this need not to be the case. Budget constraints can affect considerably the set
of Walrasian equilibria regardless of whether they are equal or unequal.
Example 2. Consider a market with three bidders and two real items. The seller’s
reservation prices are given by (c0, c1, c2) = (0, 0, 0), bidders’ budgets are given by m
1 = 3,
m2 = 1, m3 = 6, and their values are given in Table 2.
Suppose p is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector. Then we must have p1 ≤ 3 and
p2 ≤ 5. Otherwise no bidder would demand any real item. When p2 = p1 + 2, we have
D3(p) = {1, 2}. If p2 = p1 + 2 > 3, then D1(p) = D2(p) = {0}, and if p2 = p1 + 2 ≤ 3, then
D1(p) = {2} and D2(p) = {1}. In both cases there is no equilibrium with p2 = p1 + 2.
When p2 > p1 +2, then D
3(p) = {1}. For an equilibrium to exist, we must have p1 > 1,
which implies p2 > 3 and D
1(p) = D2(p) = {0}. But then there is no equilibrium. On the
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Table 2: Bidders’ values in Example 2.
Item 0 1 2
Bidder 1 0 0 4
Bidder 2 0 3 0
Bidder 3 0 3 5
other hand, when p2 < p1 + 2, then D
3(p) = {2}. In order to have an equilibrium we must
have p1 ≤ 1, which implies p2 < 3 and D1(p) = {2}. Again there is no equilibrium.
3 Main Results
For a nonempty set of real items S ⊆ N and a feasible price vector p, define the lower
inverse demand set of S at p by
D−S (p) = {i ∈M | D
i(p) ⊆ S},
i.e., D−S (p) is the set of bidders who demand at p only items in S. Note that S is a subset
of real items, so any bidder i in the lower inverse demand set of S at p does not demand
the dummy item and thus has a positive surplus V i(j)− pj for any item j in his demand
set Di(p). Define the upper inverse demand set of S at p by
D+S (p) = {i ∈M | D
i(p) ∩ S 6= ∅},
i.e., D+S (p) is the set of bidders that demand at p at least one of the items in S. Note that
the latter set contains the former set. Let |A| denote the cardinality of a finite set A.
Definition 3.1
Let p be a feasible price vector.
1. A nonempty set of real items S ⊆ N is overdemanded at p if |D−S (p)| > |S|. An
overdemanded set S at p is minimal if no proper subset of S is overdemanded at p.
2. A nonempty set of real items S ⊆ N is underdemanded at p if both S ⊆ {j ∈ N | pj > cj}
and |D+S (p)| < |S|.
The notion of minimal overdemanded set is used in Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986)
and the notion of underdemanded set can be found in Sotomayor (2002) and Mishra and
Talman (2010). Note that a feasible price vector p is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector
if and only if at p there is neither underdemand nor overdemand.
The first lemma is due to van der Laan and Yang (2016, p.124, Lemma 3.4) and will
be invoked.
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Lemma 3.2 Let T be a minimal overdemanded set at feasible price vector p and let T ′
be a nonempty proper subset of T . Then
|{i ∈ D−T (p) | D
i(p) ∩ T ′ 6= ∅}| ≥ |T ′|+ |D−T (p)| − |T |.
For any p, q ∈ IRn+1, let min(p, q) denote the componentwise minimum of p and q, and
max(p, q) the componentwise maximum of p and q. A set X ⊆ IRn+1 is a lower semi-lattice
if X contains min(p, q) for any p, q ∈ X. The set X is a lattice if X contains both min(p, q)
and max(p, q) for any p, q ∈ X. Let NOD denote the set of feasible integer price vectors at
which there is no overdemand. The next lemma shows that NOD is a lower semi-lattice.
Lemma 3.3 The set NOD is a nonempty lower semi-lattice.
Proof. Clearly, the set NOD is not empty. Consider any p, q ∈ NOD. Then r =
min(p, q) is also a feasible integer price vector. Denote S+ = {j ∈ N | pj < qj}, S− = {j ∈
N | pj > qj}, and S = {j ∈ N | pj = qj}. Suppose there is overdemand at r and let T be
a minimal overdemanded set at r. Thus |D−T (r)| > |T |. Denote T+ = T ∩ (S+ ∪ S) and
T− = T ∩ (S− ∪ S). By definition at least one of these two sets is not empty. Suppose T+
is not empty. According to Lemma 3.2 we have that
|{i ∈ D−T (r) | D
i(r) ∩ T+ 6= ∅}| ≥ |T+|+ |D−T (r)| − |T | ≥ |T
+|+ 1.
Since rj = pj for every j ∈ S+ ∪ S and rj = qj < pj for every j ∈ S−, it follows that
Di(p) ⊆ T+ if Di(r) ∩ T+ 6= ∅. Hence,
|{i ∈M | Di(p) ⊆ T+}| ≥ |T+|+ 1,
implying that T+ is overdemanded at p. This contradicts that p ∈ NOD. Similarly, when
T− is not empty, we obtain that T− is overdemanded at q, contradicting that q ∈ NOD.
2
The proof of Lemma 3.3 and Example 1 show that the set of Walrasian equilibrium
price vectors is a lower semi-lattice, which is not necessarily closed. Lemma 3.3 implies
the following corollary, saying that there is a minimal integer price vector at which there is
no overdemand. Note that this generalizes the well-known fact that for the model without
budget constraints there is a unique minimal Walrasian equilibrium (integer) price vector.
Let the price vector pmin be defined by pminj = minp∈NOD pj for all j ∈ N0.
Corollary 3.4 It holds that pmin ∈ NOD.
The next lemma states that when p is an integer Walrasian equilibrium price vector,
then any q ∈ NOD satisfying q ≤ p is also a Walrasian equilibrium price vector.
7
Lemma 3.5 If q, p ∈ NOD, q  p, and p is a WE price vector, then q is a WE price
vector.
Proof. Let π be a Walrasian equilibrium assignment at p. We show that there exists a
Walrasian equilibrium assignment ρ at q. Define S = {j ∈ N | qj < pj}. Note that S
is nonempty. Since p is a WE price vector, we have that S is neither overdemanded nor
underdemanded at p, i.e.,
|D−S (p)| ≤ |S| and |D
+
S (p)| ≥ |S|.
Because qj < pj for every j ∈ S, we have that Di(q) ⊆ S for every i ∈ D+S (p). Hence,
we must have that |D+S (p)| ≤ |S|, otherwise S is overdemanded at q. It follows that
|D+S (p)| = |S|. Since qj < pj for every j ∈ S, we have that pj > cj for every item j ∈ S.
Therefore, at p every item j ∈ S is assigned to a bidder. However, only the bidders in the
set D+S (p) demand items from S at p. With |D
+
S (p)| = |S| it then follows that π(i) ∈ S for
every i ∈ D+S (p) and that every j ∈ S is assigned to a bidder in D
+
S (p).
From |D+S (p)| = |S| it also follows that there is no bidder h ∈M \D
+
S (p) with D
h(q) ⊆
S, again because otherwise S is overdemanded at q. This implies that for every bidder
h ∈ M \ D+S (p) it must hold that Dh(q) contains an item j not in S and thus an item j
with qj = pj. From this it follows that for every bidder h ∈M \D+S (p) it holds that
Dh(p) ⊆ Dh(q).
Therefore, for every h ∈ M \ D+S (p) it holds that π(h) ∈ Dh(q). Hence, for every h ∈
M \D+S (p) we can set ρ(h) = π(h), i.e. every bidder not in D
+
S (p) gets at q the same item
as at p. Moreover, for every bidder h ∈ M \D+S (p) it holds that π(h) ∈ N0 \ S. Further,
for any item j ∈ Nπ we have that qj = pj = cj and j ∈ N \ S, because all items in S
are assigned in π. Also at q these items can stay at the seller. It remains to show that
all items in S can be assigned at q to the bidders in D+S (p). Suppose there is a nonempty
subset T ⊆ S that is underdemanded at q, so the number of bidders that demand items
from T at q is less than |T |. Because the bidders in D+S (p) only demand items from S at
q, this implies that at q at least |D+S (p)|− (|T |− 1) bidders only demand items from S \T .
With |D+S (p)| = |S| it then follows that S \ T is overdemanded at q, which contradicts
that q ∈ NOD. So, at q there is no underdemanded subset T of S and there is also no
overdemand. Further only the bidders in D+S (p) demand items from S. This implies that
we can choose ρ such that it assigns any item in S to a bidder in D+S (p) and reversely
assigns to every bidder h in D+S (p) an item from S in its demand set D
h(q). Hence, ρ is a
Walrasian equilibrium assignment at q. 2
The next corollary follows immediately from Corollary 3.4 and Lemma 3.5.
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Corollary 3.6 If there exists an integer WE price vector, then pmin is an integer WE price
vector.
The next lemma says that if there exists a Walrasian equilibrium, then there also exists
an integer Walrasian equilibrium price vector.
Lemma 3.7 If the set of WE price vectors is not empty, it contains an integer WE price
vector.
Proof. Let (q, π) be a Walrasian equilibrium and let p be the integer price vector with,
for every j ∈ N0, pj the smallest integer larger than or equal to qj. We show that (p, π)
is also a Walrasian equilibrium. Since p ≥ q, we have that p is a feasible price vector.
Moreover, for every j ∈ Nπ it holds that pj = qj = cj, so condition (b) of Definition 2.1 is
satisfied. To show condition (a) of Definition 2.1, take any i ∈ M . Since mi is an integer,
it holds that Bi(p) = Bi(q). Let j ∈ Bi(p). Since pj ≥ qj and π(i) ∈ Di(q), we obtain
V i(π(i))− qπ(i) ≥ V i(j)− qj ≥ V i(j)− pj. (3.1)
Because pπ(i) is the smallest integer larger than or equal to qπ(i) and pj is an integer, this
implies
V i(π(i))− pπ(i) ≥ V i(j)− pj. (3.2)
This shows that (p, π) also satisfies condition (a) of Definition 2.1 and is therefore a WE.
2
The next corollary follows immediately from Corollary 3.6 and Lemma 3.7.
Corollary 3.8 If pmin is not a WE price vector, then a Walrasian equilibrium does not
exist.
In the remaining of this section we prove that the auction of Demange, Gale, and So-
tomayor (1986) (DGS auction in short) terminates with the minimal integer price vector
pmin at which there is no overdemand. If there is no underdemand at pmin, then a Wal-
rasian equilibrium exists and the auction terminates with the minimal integer Walrasian
equilibrium price vector pmin. If there is underdemand at pmin, then pmin is not a Walrasian
equilibrium price vector and therefore according to Corollary 3.8 there exists no Walrasian
equilibrium in the market.
The DGS Auction
Step 1 (Initialization): Set t := 0, ptj := cj, j ∈ N0. Go to Step 2.
9
Step 2: Every bidder i ∈ M reports his demand set Di(pt). If there is no overde-
manded set at pt, stop. Otherwise, go to Step 3.
Step 3: The auctioneer chooses a minimal overdemanded set Ot ⊆ N of items. Then
set pt+1j := p
t
j + 1 for every j ∈ Ot, pt+1j := ptj for every j ∈ N0 \ Ot. Set t := t + 1
and return to Step 2.
The next theorem generalizes the fact that for the setting without budget constraints
the DGS auction ends with the minimal Walrasian equilibrium price vector to the setting
with budget constrained bidders.
Theorem 3.9 The DGS auction above terminates with pmin in a finite number of steps.
Proof. Because every bidder has only a bounded valuation on every item and the price
of each item is monotonically increasing, the DGS auction will clearly stop at some round,
say t∗. Let t∗ be the last round of the DGS auction and let p = pt
∗
. So, p ∈ NOD and
pt 6∈ NOD for every 0 ≤ t < t∗. If t∗ = 0, then p0 is the minimal integer Walrasian
equilibrium price vector pmin, because by definition there is no underdemand at p0.
Otherwise, suppose that p 6= pmin. By Lemma 3.3 we must have that p ≥ pmin and
pj > p
min
j for some j ∈ N . By construction, we have that p0 ≤ pmin. Let t < t∗ be the
last round at which pt ≤ pmin. Since t < t∗, there must be overdemand at pt, otherwise
the auction would have terminated at t. Let Ot = O and S = {j ∈ N |pt+1j > pminj }. Note
that S is nonempty. Since at t the price of an item j ∈ N is increased with one if and only
if j ∈ O, it follows that S ⊆ O. Moreover, since all prices are integers, ptj = pminj for all
j ∈ S. Because O is overdemanded at pt, we have that |D−O(pt)| > |O|.
Let L be the subset of bidders in D−O(p
t) that demand at least one item from S. By
Lemma 3.2 it holds that
|L| ≥ |S|+ |D−O(p
t)| − |O| > |S|. (3.3)
So, L is not empty. Consider a bidder i ∈ L, an item j ∈ S ∩Di(pt), and an item k 6= j.
First, consider the case that k 6∈ O, then k 6∈ Di(pt) and either bidder i prefers j to k at




k ≤ pmink , we have that also at
pmin item j is preferred above k or k is not affordable for i and so k 6∈ Di(pmin). Second,
let k ∈ O \ S. Then bidder i likes item j at least as well as item k, because i demands j
and maybe also k at price pt, or item k is not affordable for i at pt. Since k ∈ O but not in
S, we have that pt+1k = p
t
k + 1 ≤ pmink . On the other hand ptj = pminj . Again, we have that
at pmin item j is preferred above k or k is not affordable for i and so k 6∈ Di(pmin). Hence,
Di(pmin) does not contain any item from N \S. Finally, since j ∈ Di(pt), the dummy item
is not in Di(pt), because Di(pt) ⊆ O, and ptj = pminj , it follows that j is affordable at pmin
10
and is preferred above the dummy item at pmin. Hence, Di(pmin) ⊆ S. Because there is
no overdemand at pmin, we must have that |L| ≤ |S|, which contradicts inequality (3.3).
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